In recent years, a connection between children, youth, and the social, cultural, and economic transformations widely referred to as globalization has become apparent. Child laborers in South Asia, child soldiers in Sierra Leone and Uganda, Chinese youth playing computer games to earn virtual gold, youth involved in sex trafficking in the former Soviet republics and Thailand: these are just some of the young people featured in the news of late. Most scholars have tried to theorize the empirical link between youth and globalization by highlighting how young people promote new social relationships over previously daunting distances. Such analyses recognize that youth rework globally circulating commodities, ideas, and images, emphasizing how children and youth are agents reshaping relationships to and across space. But young people create these new cultural geographies insofar as they also embody locally variable relationships to time, particularly the future.

The idea that young people are more malleable and the truisms that “youth are the future” or “children are our hope for the future” give the news stories and scholarly accounts added meaning. To address how and why youth and children have come to seem so important to globalization, the chapters in this book look not just at the spatial relations of globalization but also the temporal dimensions. Discourses of, and practices by,
youth and children bring the new temporal conjunctions of globalization into relationship with people’s negotiation of the life course. Such discourses and practices, which reach from the design of children’s toys to youth political mobilization, are critical sites through which people everywhere conceive of, produce, contest, and naturalize the new futures.

Much of the scholarship that examines youth and globalization in relation to space builds on the Birmingham school youth-culture studies of an earlier era. These emphasized how youthful subcultures resisted and contested class oppression by playing with and creatively re-presenting cultural codes embodied in specific commodities and styles (Hall and Jefferson 1991[1976]; Hebdige 1979). The studies situated youth creativity in the context of changing geographies of class and labor practices in post-war Britain, including an influx of former colonial subjects to England. Anoop Nayak (2003) uses this type of analysis to show how British youth reconfigure local geographies of race and ethnicity through their cultural practices. The recent volume Youthscape: The Popular, the National, the Global continues to use the geographic image of a “scape” when looking at youth practices,1 to bring together “questions about popular culture and relations of power in local, national and globalized contexts” (Maira and Soep 2005:xviii). Another edited collection focused on youth in Africa, though not explicitly tied to Birmingham-style analyses, similarly uses the term youth(e)scapes, inadvertently emphasizing the spatial dimensions of youth practice (Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2006:20).

Birmingham school youth studies are also significant for their emphasis on processes of social reproduction, a temporal phenomenon. Some recent writers have continued to explore how adults’ reorganization of processes of social reproduction takes place in the lives of children and youth. States and corporations deploy images of children and youth to enact specific globalized agendas, some of which are detrimental to children. Sue Ruddick argues that the constitutive elements of globalization include “a celebration of risk, reduction in state funding for social reproduction in developed nations and pressures to modernize in underdeveloped ones” and that these “are being ‘smuggled in’ in the guise of new discourses about youth and childhood” (Ruddick 2003:334).2 And Cindi Katz (2004) demonstrates the differential effects of global capitalism on processes of social reproduction in a rural village in the Sudan and in New York City, highlighting how global capitalism creates common problems for youth in different places and circumstances.

Temporality is critical to the processes of global capitalism with which Ruddick and Katz are concerned. Many images discussed by Ruddick have
powerful temporal references associated with the ideologies of modernity, in which historical backwardness is encapsulated in the body of the feral or stunted child. Similarly, Katz (2004), though focused primarily on remaking local geographies, is interested in how global economic changes shift the grounds of the future when many children learn skills that will not help them later on because of rapidly changing environmental and labor conditions. Brad Weiss (2004:8) has observed that as people negotiate the emerging and shifting possibilities of inclusion or exclusion in new forms of community, an important question for them is not only how to join but also “what will the [criteria for participation] be tomorrow?”

These examples suggest that temporality is an important dimension of globalization and that youth and children help negotiate new futures. Nevertheless, existing work persists in foregrounding children and youth’s role in reworking the emergent cultural geographies associated with new spatial relations. The result is that it analytically privileges space over time. The analytical focus on space emerges in ideas about scapes, mobility, and geographically expansive imaginations. It also appears in the recurrent use of a language of marginality and in the debates that envision global flows more in terms of moving through space than carving out new temporal dimensions. The role of youth and children in the remaking of place is surely important, but most current analyses fail to take sufficient account of the temporal nature of youth and childhood.

We begin our project of making temporality more central by examining more closely the key categories at the heart of our inquiry: childhood and youth, on the one hand, and globalization, on the other.

**SHIFTING DEFINITIONS OF CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH**

Childhood and youth are notoriously difficult categories to define. Euro-American common sense suggests that the life course unfolds according to a developmental teleology in which human beings move naturally from infancy and early childhood through adolescence, adulthood, and old age (Erikson 1950; Schlegel and Barry 1991; Steedman 1995). This assumption of naturally unfolding, age-prescribed stages underpins psychological studies of human development, as well as research in psychological anthropology. Even Margaret Mead, who famously contested G. Stanley Hall’s (1904) description of adolescence through her research in Samoa, never questioned the existence of the stage per se, just its content.

Contrary to this perspective, many studies have pointed out that social processes determine who can claim to be in a category called childhood or youth and who can describe others as being in this category. Studies of
African societies make this point most sharply by highlighting the disjunctur e between chronological age and generational age. Meyer Fortes (1984) described how very young people can be senior to elderly people through the generational logic of lineal descent groups. Similarly, Marc Schloss (1988) explained how a four-year-old who has undergone an initiation ceremony that Senegalese Ehing hold every twenty-five years may be given all the privileges and rights to exercise knowledge of a forty-year-old whereas thirty-year-olds who have missed the ceremony are treated, in many respects, as children. Jennifer Johnson-Hanks (2002) goes even further, using her Cameroonian material to argue for abolishing a life-stage approach altogether. Instead, she suggests that analysis focus on how individual aspirations intersect with institutions in what she terms “vital conjunctures,” allowing for a more fluid model of how individuals move through time. In conjunction with scholarship on the life course drawn from many contexts, this work makes clear that age categories vary by historical period (Ariès 1962[1960]; Hanawalt 1993; Kett 1977; Levi and Schmitt 1997); across cultures (Herdt and Leavitt 1998; Mead 1964[1928]; Raum 1996[1940]); among classes (Kett 1977; Liechty 2003); and between genders (Cole 2004).

In the mid-twentieth century, this common sense model of age categories and the unfolding of the life course was enshrined in laws and public institutions and held up as a natural progression to which all should aspire. Consequently, Euro-American ideas about the life course provide an implicit foil against which the chapters in this volume are written. It is important, then, to sketch out some key elements and background.

During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, new ideas about childhood and adolescence were shaped by a complicated network of changes: transformations in the organization of production and consumption, shifts in women’s political and professional voices, the rise of new disciplines in the academy, and the growing impact of consumerism. Taken together, these created an increasing gap between the possibilities of physical reproduction and social reproduction, a gap we have come to refer to as adolescence. Experts in child development and social welfare justified these changes by arguing that this age was uniquely fragile, requiring adult supervision and protection (Kett 1977). Around the same time, labor laws were created that prevented younger people from working. Sometimes, these laws supported the desires of older people to keep younger competitors out of the labor market (Hareven 1995). At other times, new laws attempted to enact broadly a class- and culture-specific vision of childhood, as Paula Fass discusses in chapter 2 of this volume. Transformations of a
labor-centered life course were not confined to childhood and youth. At the other end, particular interest groups lobbied for the creation of retirement benefits and a retirement age, contributing to ideas of an old age in which one does not have to, or cannot competently, work (Chudacoff 1989).

Two broad shifts relating to this model are particularly relevant, although the periodicity and timing are different for each. First, during the twentieth century, with increased travel and communications and in the context of colonial and neocolonial encounters, different constructions of the life course increasingly came into contact with one another. When new chronologies of the life cycle are introduced, the temporality of growing up often becomes a source of tension, with different age groups claiming the privileges of a new social space (Durham 2004). Recent examples are the programs for youth based on UN guidelines (such as the UN convention on the rights of the child) and the international child-saving projects, which may or may not match local conceptions of the life course. The introduction of new life courses may have deep historical roots, but this process has accelerated in recent years.

At the same time, the naturalized life course has not remained static. The modernist model of a linear life course has undergone its own transformations. Scholars even refer to a “post-modern” life course in which “age” and “youth” are detached from their biological referents (Moody 1993). In some cases, changing social and economic conditions extend the social markers of youth further and further up the chronological life course, with varying implications, depending on the socioeconomic context. In the United States, rising affluence, changing demographics, and better health combine with consumer culture to enable people in their thirties, forties, and fifties to enjoy aspects of physical fitness and leisure associated with youthfulness. Ages forty, forty-five, and even fifty become “the new 30” (Jefferson and Hey 2003; see also Arnett 2004). The same phenomenon, which indicates relative wealth in the United States, is connected with poverty in Africa. There, the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s meant that the ability to grow up (to pass through and beyond the social dependence associated with youth) is increasingly difficult to achieve (Cole 2004, 2005; Durham 2004; Masquelier 2005). Many young people are “stuck in the compound,” as Karen Hansen’s (2005) informants describe their predicament in a Zambian neighborhood: they cannot acquire the resources to move out of their natal homes to create new households of their own. As a result, they are unable to achieve social adulthood.

In other places, evidence now suggests that changing social, cultural, and economic conditions push the responsibilities and stresses formerly
associated with social adulthood down the life cycle onto people who, in fairly recent times or in other social classes, would have been conceived of as children meriting protection. In the United States, developmental psychologists and newspapers report that puberty (the physical marker of adulthood) comes earlier because of better nutrition associated with rising affluence. In France, as in the United States, the age of childhood has been creeping downward in the courts. Younger and younger people are being held morally responsible for criminal actions and intent (Terrio in press). Perhaps not surprisingly, young immigrants and descendants of immigrants are more often judged as capable of criminal intent and morally culpable than are young native Frenchmen. In Japan, young people shut themselves in their rooms for months, even years, rejecting the stresses of a highly competitive schooling system (Allison, chapter 8, this volume; Lock 1988). One author (Field 1995) even referred to this intense exam preparation as the “loss of childhood.”

We make these points to alert readers to the slippery nature of the categories and also to remind them that such categories are profoundly entangled in social processes. What is also important to understand is that shifts in the chronology of life stages are significant not only because of the changing content of the age categories—these shifts are part of how the changes associated with globalization come to be naturalized. Before addressing how this happens, we need to look more closely at the equally slippery set of processes referred to as globalization.

MODERNITY AND GLOBALIZATION: REWORKING SPACE AND TIME

Two aspects of recent social and economic changes are relevant to our concerns here. First, since the late 1970s, there has been an increased and more rapid movement of goods, people, and ideas around the world. These movements are uneven in reach and direction, with new landscapes of wealth and opportunity, or their lack, connecting and disconnecting different parts of the globe in highly differentiated ways (Ferguson 2006; Hoogvelt 1997; Neilson 2003). The movements of people, capital, goods, and ideas do not necessarily happen in tandem, creating what Arjun Appadurai (1996) has called disjunctures in the experience of globalization. One widespread effect of these movements is that people increasingly imagine themselves as part of a global landscape with potential horizons now much more far-flung and varied. In scope and content, this imagination differs considerably from place to place. Urban middle-class Americans may be more convinced of growing global horizons than, say, young people
in rural Sudan, whose only choices are local farm tenancies (tied, nonetheless, to global capital), higher education in Khartoum, and the Sudanese military as potential sources of income (Katz 2004).

Second, transformations have taken place in the organization of social reproduction. In places such as the United States and parts of Europe, the state has ceded aspects of social reproduction to other agencies or parts of society, including families and individuals. Some of these agencies are transnational, including corporations, nongovernmental organizations, criminal networks, and religious groups. New social legislation on marriage, medicine, taxation, and immigration tightens the state’s hold on citizenship and social reproduction in still other ways. Because the welfare state was never universal, its contemporary decline and reorganization can be grasped only comparatively. Americans and French citizens may complain about cuts in welfare benefits, but elderly nonresident South Asians find state benefits in the United States abundant compared with those available in India (Lamb 2007).

We do not make a causal argument here, but we do know that these facets of globalization are linked. The rapid and increased movements of people, images, and commodities foster global imaginations. In turn, widening horizons feed increased movements. The weakening of the welfare state is part and parcel of the increasingly flexible mobility of capital. Rising membership in non-state-based communities (ethno-national, religious, and of other social character, such as women, gays, and Pokémon masters) is partly symptomatic of the failure of the social contract that bound, or aimed to bind, people to their states in order to guarantee well-being. These new kinds of communities are also a product of the explosion of new forms of communication and movement of consumer goods through which some identities are made. Increased movement of commodities and people and the decreasing role of states in assuring the social reproduction of a people are but two sides of the same coin.

Whether one focuses on the movement of capital and ideas or on new arrangements to ensure social reproduction, both entail the reconfiguration of space and time as they characterized mid-century modernity. In The Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens (1990) emphasizes the transformation of temporality that occurs as the reorganization of capital, combined with new technologies, alters the relation of time to space. He argues that, in pre-modern contexts, time and space were intertwined because one could not tell what time of day it was without reference to particular spatial markers (such as the sun setting in the west). In modern contexts, new technologies (including the clock) and modes of transport have created
what he calls “space time distanciation.” People experience events in remote places as if these were close at hand. The “extreme dynamism and globalizing scope” of modernity are closely connected to the separation of time and space (Giddens 1990:16). The result is the linking of vast distances into a single temporal structure encompassing both simultaneity and difference. Johannes Fabian’s (1983) argument—that persistent evolutionary narratives, when mapped onto space, imply that our past is still being lived by distant others—makes this phenomenon especially apparent.

In Reinhart Koselleck’s 1985 study of the semantics of historical time, he argues that the idea of the future being different from the past is a temporal structure that emerged in the context of Western modernity. There is a reciprocal interaction between the speed of technological inventions and people’s perception of the future. An increased orientation toward the future characterizes the emergence of modernity as a particular historical epoch. Koselleck observes, “If the contemporary in question detects in his subjective experiential balance an increase in the weight of the future, this is certain to be an effect of the technical-industrial modification of a world that forces upon its inhabitants ever-briefer intervals of time in which to gather new experiences and adapt to changes induced at an accelerating pace” (Koselleck 1985:xxiv). This changing ratio of expectation to experience is what shapes a sense of progress—the idea that the future will be better than the past.

Analyses of more recent patterns (those often seen as iconic of globalization) highlight the intensification and reconfiguration of modern structurings of time and space. David Harvey (1989) has argued that the hallmark of the current moment is the development of new, flexible kinds of labor and production practices that shrink time and space. Whereas previously it took a few days for a telegram to deliver information across vast distances, now people located in very different parts of the world can simultaneously watch the same event unfold on TV. The reorganization of capital and the new technologies, in turn, accelerate social and cultural life as people make business decisions and transmit information faster than ever before.

Manuel Castells (1996) similarly highlights the reworking of space and time in what he refers to as the “network society,” his term for the set of processes that others call globalization. New technologies and kinds of organization such as cottage industries, in which people can work from home and telecommute, entail the reorganization of space. Castells also describes the emergence of what he calls a “timeless time,” especially in the domain of capital. Timeless time includes even the “capture of future time
in present transactions” (Castells 1996:436), as in the market for futures, options, and derivatives. Against this timeless time, disjunctive times proliferate. Flexible labor and production arrangements that foster the use of different temporal zones disrupt the neat chronologies of the modernist life cycle organized around an adulthood of regularly scheduled, paid labor. The exclusion of many locales and social groups from the new “network society” produces further temporal disjunctures. Against the universal clock of modernity, Castells (1996:445) observes a new “social arrhythmia,” a disruption of the social clocks of work, reproduction, aging, and especially death. As provocative as his proposals are, he gives little attention to childhood or youth. He does draw upon classic modernist developmental metaphors, however, in expressions such as “embryos of a new relationship between our social and biological condition” (Castells 1996:450).

These different lines of inquiry into contemporary social and economic changes suggest that in recent years there has been a profound reworking of how space and time are experienced in everyday life. To date, anthropologists have focused primarily on the reworkings of space in the form of “global imaginations.” When exploring time, anthropologists have focused more on the past and its relationship to the present. Munn (1992:115) notes that “futurity is poorly attended to as a specifically temporal problem” in anthropology. By examining children and youth and the practices they engage in, we can begin to discern the temporal disjunctures and potential futures that are central to processes of globalization.

FIGURING THE FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

In examining the role of children or youth around the world in creating the future, the volume’s authors write from the perspective of various disciplines, including history, sociology, and social psychology, but mainly anthropology. Some focus primarily on children or youth’s engagement with commodities, work, and the restructuring of class relations. Others focus on youth in relation to conceptions of agency and political action. The authors touch on topics such as clothing, religion, toys, music, and the creation of children and youth as historical categories.

We conceive of the “future” as comprising three dimensions: (1) how the future is imagined through specific representations of temporality, (2) how one orients oneself and others to it through sentiments like hope or anxiety and their relationship to risk, and (3) how one substantively creates it by designing and normalizing new kinds of practices. A common theme in all the chapters is the sense that youth practices—by which we mean the
actions undertaken both by young people and by people and institutions concerning youth—are fraught with risk and uncertainty and are, in the phrase often invoked during the seminar, on the cusp of success and failure. Rather than summarize the chapters here, we draw upon various aspects of them to illustrate these three points.

Embodying Temporality, Making Subjects

At first glance, one might think that the way children and youth embody temporality in the context of globalization differs little from what took place during the early-to-middle part of the twentieth century. During that historical period, youth worldwide often mobilized diverse interests around a rupture with the past in order to move toward a new and better future (Anderson 1972; Chow 1967; Neyzi 2001). Such a vision dovetailed well with modernization theory, a widely used scholarly and popular paradigm for interpreting historical change. Given that some theories of globalization share this sense of futurism with earlier theories of modernization (Cooper 2001; Walley 2004), one might expect that youth continue to figure the future in this way. But if one looks at the current ways children or youth embody temporality, the picture becomes considerably more complex.

Two chapters demonstrate how practices associated with children and youth conceal and also reveal the disjunctures of globalization, through a process we call “temporal folding”: the bringing together of different chronotopes and temporalities. Anne Allison’s chapter 8 examines the cultural politics of Pokémon production and consumption, mainly in Japan but also in the United States. Pokémon becomes a medium that combines anxieties about an almost inhumanly asocial future with various relations to the past. The inventor of Pokémon drew on his experiences as a child collecting insects to create a game that would address fears about the isolation and alienation of people caught up in the demands of school, work, and long commutes. In the playscape of Pokémon, the creators brought together traditions and myths of an ancient Japan, relations to nature that are key symbols of Japanese national identity, notions of measured and disciplined growth, and, paradoxically, the increasingly frenetic tempo associated with late capitalism and globalization. As Japan faced the economic downturn in the 1990s that followed its dramatic earlier success, Pokémon became a way to reinvent the basis of economic recovery and resurgence. Far from the universalist conception of space/time compression advanced by David Harvey, the commodified cultural specificity of Pokémon enables the persistence of particular ideas about the past and future in the context of intense time/space compression.
By contrast, the youth practices featured in Brad Weiss’s chapter 9, on apocalyptic hip-hop in Tanzania, offer a very different vision of temporal folding. Set in the context of post-socialist market reform in Tanzania, Weiss’s chapter examines how unemployed and underemployed male youth eagerly perform and listen to African American–inspired hip-hop music with religious themes. The songs warn listeners of the coming apocalypse, urging them to “keep it real” in the face of worldly temptations. In Allison’s chapter 8, children appear to embody new forms of temporality closely linked with social and economic reorganization. But the male youth discussed in Weiss’s chapter, though equally affected by recent changes associated with economic liberalization, embrace an alternative, oppositional vision. In their lyrics, they reject the sped-up, disjunctive life in which money, women, and friends are gained and lost at dizzying speeds and rapid shifts in fortune undercut the possibilities of a new, adult future. Instead, they advocate a radical break with the past and a reorientation of the present that comes to terms with the approaching apocalypse, the known future.

The institutional settings through which different age groups move also shape the subjective experience of temporality. Certain disciplines of temporality regiment how subjects move through time. In US society, a well-known example is the careful measurement of childhood, its institutionalized precision and slow progress. Early months are momentous, years in school carefully monitored, and advancement measured, even regulated, yearly. In a related vein, upper-middle-class Americans monitor their children’s math and science test scores as carefully as they monitor export and import figures, constantly comparing their children’s progress with that of children in other nations. These practices constitute a particular temporality of childhood and a particular way of conceiving of, and investing in, the future. Two chapters address disciplines of temporality and how such temporal disciplines relate to particular conceptions of the subject, which imply a particular relation to the future.

Ann Anagnost’s chapter 3 examines childrearing in market-reform China. She illustrates how such disciplines of temporality in childhood play out as Chinese parents anxiously scan their children’s bodies for the appropriate signs of physical and cognitive growth and compare these with growth of children in other nations. Chinese parents fear that their children will be unprepared for the new kind of future created by the demise of state socialism and the integration of China into global markets. Before, the state had an active role in shaping a future that departs from the past, but now individuals increasingly bear the burden of economic success or
failure. As a result, adults are anxious about how to prepare children for the future. Parents, particularly mothers, invest a huge amount of labor in training children to embody the right kind of value and therefore future. Children become sites of value creation, accumulating their mother and father's anxious investments.

Anagnost implies that the increased liberalization of China's economy makes parents invest in their children in ways that echo practices familiar from upper-middle-class European and American contexts. By contrast, Deborah Durham's chapter 7, which offers a critical analysis of the concept of youth agency popular in much contemporary writing on youth, stands as a sharp reminder that strikingly different ways of conceiving of subjects and their relation to temporality persist. The idea that youth have a special agency that is different from adults' lies at the heart of Western liberal conceptions of youth. By contrast, Herero imagine the life cycle as organized around stages that are sequential, instead of a progressive developmental unfolding. In Botswana, the life course is not perceived according to the romantic narrative in which life's unfolding necessarily leads to liberal, individuated persons who forge a new identity in tension with that of their elders, creating a rupture with the past. Rather, Herero youth are supposed to make new connections and links and to root those links within their relationally imagined home society. The vision of temporality embodied by Herero youth contrasts with the dominant romantic narrative underlying Western ideas of youth.

Orientations to the Future: Hope and Risk

The intense anxiety enveloping Chinese parents' efforts to make their children into the right kind of subjects is a poignant reminder that the future is not created only in relation to symbolic representations of time, or its structuring and regimentation in daily practice. It is also constructed through sentiments like hope and anxiety, which orient people to particular kinds of expectations. Closely intertwined with hope is risk—the dangers one might face in attempting to achieve one's hopes.

Risk taking, whether calculated, intentional, or rebelliously reckless, has been assumed to be part of everyday life by the practice-oriented anthropology of the past twenty-five years. Risk was at the heart of the temporal gap through which Bourdieu (1977) broke down the legalistic, static notion of gift reciprocity. Each gift, before it is returned, entails a risk to the parties involved, to the web of social relations, and to the expected logic of social life. Given how central risk has been to earlier anthropological work, it is curious that most past work focused explicitly on risk has
looked at how people try to conserve what they have against the dangers posed by the natural environment or society: risk as something to be minimized. As a result, Zaloom (2004:366) notes, “[e]xplorations of active, intentional engagements of risk are particularly underdeveloped.”

Youth, in particular, are known for taking risks (Jackson and Scott 1999), and risk is presented in a negative light. No surprise, then, that in the context of efforts to minimize risk, there is a large literature in public health and public policy trying to understand the “risky” behavior of youth and discussing “youth at risk” (for one example, see Dryfoos 1990). Rather than pathologize youth, however, as earlier studies of youth and risk are often accused of doing, we argue that aspects of youth practice previously represented as “risky” accrue new value in changed social and economic circumstances. Several chapters argue that, in the rapid shifts of late capitalism that quickly make certain kinds of knowledge obsolete, youth are increasingly central to more general, social processes of hope, risk taking, and the production of new knowledge.

Hope is an idea debated in philosophy and economic theory more than in anthropology; both disciplines speak more in terms of human universals than in relation to cultural variation and social motivations. There have been a few recent attempts to create an anthropology of hope, notably a speculative essay by Crapanzano (2003) and ethnographic studies in Fiji and Japan by Miyazaki (2004, 2006). Crapanzano (2003:6) states that hope is linked to temporality—hope implies a futurity, albeit in culturally distinct ways—and to the more familiar anthropological and psychological concepts of desire and agency. He focuses on cargo cults and on the South African Whites who “waited” for a resolution to the contradictions of apartheid (Crapanzano 1985). These examples lead him to suggest that hope “is the passive counterpart of desire,” that “one acts on desire” whereas “hope depends on some other agency” (Crapanzano 2003:6). He also acknowledges the uneasy relationship between the two orientations.

By contrast, members of our seminar came to see hope as an active and even agentive modality specific to particular times and places. When interpreted as an agentive orientation toward the future, hope fits into the anthropology of sentiment and emotion, which recent literature suggests are culturally and historically specific phenomena (Farquhar 2002; Geurts 2002; Lutz 1988; Seremetakis 1994; Stoller 1989). Emotion and sentiment are “formations of everyday life (temporal, dispersed, shifting) and everyday life [is] thoroughly suffused with discourses (collective, concrete, historical)” (Farquhar 2002:8). Emotion and sentiment are also specific forms of human action on self, other, and the wider world. Because globalization
is associated with disjunctive sets of “flows” of people, goods, images, and ideas, it seems possible that hope can increase in the contemporary context. After all, each new flow carries different forms of knowledge and the potential for new orientations and new hopes. Looking at hope and its enactments in everyday life allows us to examine not just the spatial dimensions of these flows but also the ways they enter into the temporalities of people’s lives and relationships.

Conceived in this way, hope is political, a sentiment that diversely situated actors deploy to link, challenge, or reconfigure domestic, national, and transnational relationships (Durham n.d.; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990). Particular institutions embody hope. Particular actors seek to fulfill their own hopes by engaging with those institutions. Such institutions stretch across the domains of family and state: the Red Cross and Green Crescent, the transnational projects of Habitat for Humanity, the anti-globalization movements that prompt consumer buying and boycotts for Fair Trade. In this sense, hope is a form of social action that is deeply engaged in human connections.

Because hope is oriented toward the future, it draws our attention to the temporality of sentiment. The specific ways that hope, as an aspect of future making, is intertwined with social relationships and institutions are particularly visible in Paula Fass’s chapter 2. In offering a historical account of children, youth, and globalization from the perspective of the United States, Fass provides a snapshot of how hope was embodied in institutions related to children in the early and mid-twentieth century, against which more recent changes can be read. In the United States, the institutions of childhood, including schools and child labor laws, were first created in the expectation that childhood could be protected from the market. Ironically, the institutionalization of romantic cultural ideals designed to protect children’s innocence actually helped constitute “the market” as a separate realm of activity (Zelizer 1985). Ideally, these changes were to create the agents of a better society characterized by greater equality and social progress. Of course, this romantic vision of childhood never applied to immigrant lower classes. Fass notes that as global inequalities increase, any continuation of childhood as it was conceived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in America will require a renewed commitment to the liberatory and progressive hopes enshrined in institutions and laws created in the name of childhood at that time.

Fass urges that we heed the history of US efforts to protect children from the market. Many of the chapters suggest that the current climate of economic liberalization has plunged children into the center of the mar-
ket in ways that previous laws sought to prevent. The processes associated with globalization—be they socially progressive or neoliberal—challenge older ways of constructing childhood.

These links between hope, access to knowledge, and risk are discussed in several chapters. Constance Flanagan’s contribution, chapter 6, directly addresses the issues raised by Fass by showing how youth struggle with the new social contract, which has eroded the institutions created one hundred years ago explicitly to protect them from the vagaries of the market. US youth understand that the new conditions of flexible capital mean that they must work harder and regularly retool in order to meet the needs of the market. These youth are involved in new forms of political activism, such as United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), that offer more collective solutions to these problems. Hope is inscribed in their attitudes toward education and the political field; it is neither passive nor dependent on outside agencies. Among disadvantaged young people in America, hope is embodied in their determined belief that hard work and personal moral choices produce one’s future. Much as Anagnost describes for China, hope is also paired with anxiety, self-doubt, and enormous risk because young people can see, all around them in America, those who have failed—the unemployed, the homeless, the eternally dependent.

Although hope is knit together with desire for material or social betterment, it is neither the same thing as desire nor merely the passive aspect of desire that Crapanzano suggests. This point becomes clear in the attitudes of the more privileged youth with whom Flanagan worked. They are more cynical than their disadvantaged counterparts about the ability of schooling and the power of their individual will to fulfill their desires. These more privileged youth pursue societal betterment through the rapidly changing new technologies that enable new forms of political action: conscientious shopping, blogging, participating in evanescent political groups. It is too soon to tell, however, whether this new style of politics—which encourages autonomy, creativity, and entrepreneurship, the very traits that flexible capitalism also celebrates—will endure.

The links between hope and risk are also visible in Jennifer Cole’s chapter 5, on youth fashion practice and sex-for-money relationships in contemporary Madagascar. During the post-independence and state-socialist period, most urban Malagasy sought upward mobility through schooling, believing that they would gain the skills necessary to ensure their futures. Since economic liberalization in the early 1990s, however, the future opened up by schooling has become more uncertain. An increasing number of young women use fashion as a way to attract European men, with
whom they want to forge relationships. The ability to perform fashion correctly relies on particular kinds of knowledge about which fashions make women desirable to European men, as well as on the transient quality of a youthful body. The girls hope that, by marrying a European, they can move up social hierarchies within Madagascar or jump tracks by moving out of Madagascar to become part of a global middle class. If successful, they can convert youthful physical beauty into more enduring cultural capital. However, these young women put themselves at considerable risk because of their brief window of time in which to succeed and because of their vulnerability to AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, and pregnancy.

Tobias Hecht’s chapter 10, about a Brazilian street youth who imagines herself in global society, offers another example of how hope, knowledge, and risk intertwine. Hecht’s chapter focuses on his interactions with Bruna Veríssimo, a transgendered, homeless youth who works as a prostitute in northeast Brazil. Bruna is well aware that images of street children have been transmitted abroad, even commodified, by global humanitarians and that, as a result, her story is also a potentially valuable commodity. Indeed, the primary way Bruna imagines herself in global society is as a commodity, that is, “photographed and written about, in whose name money is raised and social movements galvanized.” While Bruna struggles to realize her life as a desirable prostitute and to defend her independence and femininity on the streets, she also traffics in images of herself with the anthropologist. Her self-representation is a form of commerce and also a form of self-making through which she attempts to realize her hopes. But she must constantly place herself at risk. The only future Bruna can imagine is one in which she moves spatially but remains a street child—as if the future she hopes for is always elsewhere.

Transforming Practices: Commodities, Attachment, and Emergent Sociality

Children and youth create the future in a third way, as others have also noted: children and youth’s practices, sometimes inadvertently, generate new ways of thinking, feeling, and being that carry into the future. Flanagan observes in chapter 6 that “the lens of youth is a good vantage point” for framing what society will look like in the future. It would be easy to argue that youth practices rarely outlast the context of their production—essentially, the vision of youth enshrined in the Eriksonian notion of a moratorium. There is good evidence, however, that some of the practices created by youth do become routinized, so these provide an important site for illuminating patterns of social change.
Children and youth often create new practices by drawing on available resources and transforming them. During the 1950s, young men in Britain wore certain clothes (as in the case of the teddy boys’ use of Edwardian fashions) to forge a particular class-based identity for themselves, drawing on older items to refashion new kinds of identity and cultural practices (Hebdige 1979). It was this aspect of youth on which Karl Mannheim (1993) focused when he wrote about the process of “fresh contact.” Through fresh contact, each new generation reshapes existing social and cultural practices into new forms. For example, college students in the 1920s pioneered practices such as fads associated with mass culture (Fass 1977), and young participants in the countercultural movements of the 1960s changed the ways in which they parented their children (Weisner and Bernheimer 1998). This aspect of how youth create the future could cover an infinite number of topics; the chapters in this volume focus particularly on young people’s use of commodities in relation to affective attachments.

In highlighting the relationship between commodities and attachment, the chapters build on earlier studies from within the tradition of psychological anthropology that emphasized how culturally specific socialization practices molded children’s psychological development. Attachment—the profound emotional bonds that a child develops with its primary caretakers—mediated this process. Early psychological anthropologists were inspired by the imperatives of Boasian anthropology to understand cultural specificity, yet equally engaged in probing Freudian claims about universal patterns of human development. They sought to illuminate patterns of attachment and how these contributed to personality formation in other societies. The desire to explain broad patterns of culture and personality has given way to more nuanced approaches emphasizing how individuals make sense of, and deploy, wider cultural meanings (Briggs 1998). Patterns of affective identification, however, continue to provide important clues as to how this happens. Unlike earlier work, which situated such processes within a private domain conceived of as separate from the market, this volume demonstrates both the mutual constitution of home and market and the role of children in these processes (Stephens 1995; Zelizer 1985). The chapters are in step with a broader movement within the social sciences to conceptualize affect in ways that stretch beyond the individual (Clough 2007; Massumi 2002).

During our seminar discussions, it became obvious that commodities purchased for or used by children are part of historically unprecedented patterns of attachment and/ or parental investment associated with recent social and economic changes. As Allison argues in chapter 8, for example,
the makers of the game Pokémon created it partly to assuage Japanese adults’ worries that children are becoming “amenbo kids” (Hakuhōdō Seikatsu Sōgō Kenkyūjo 1997). The concern is that children, “like water spiders, attach easily, but superficially, to multiple things” (Allison, chapter 8). Ironically, Pokémon “promises an alternative world of connectiveness.” The logic of this connectiveness, however, works to socialize children into a worldview of accumulation, competition, and consumption associated with the very patterns of behavior parents fear. Likewise, Anagnost’s chapter 3 highlights the new commodity practices to cultivate “quality” children in China and the new kinds of mother/child relationships these entail.

Other chapters make clear that such micro-level commodity practices help shape new macro-level social connections and cleavages. By engaging with commodities in everyday practices, children and youth transform the categories and the processes that constitute broader patterns of globalization, linking intimate domains to larger social formations (Cole and Durham 2007).

The links between more micro-level, child-centric practices and wider patterns of social inequality are particularly well illustrated by Barrie Thorne’s analysis, based on research in Oakland, California. Her chapter 4 probes how children’s use of commodities like Pokémon in the Oakland public schools shapes new global lines of class. Accelerated rates of immigration combined with state cutbacks for social services have made California’s class structure increasingly polarized. Class-privileged children live in wealthy enclaves in the hills, protected from the cultural and racialized differences that are part of day-to-day life for children who attend the public schools in the flats. Young African Americans can coax their parents into buying expensive shoes and clothing for them; Asian immigrant children cannot. Thorne shows how, in the context of widening class differences, the Pokémon cards and Hello Kitty items that circulate in exchanges, barter, and sales enable kids to interact as peers in ways that obscure class differences. The children develop a complex reading of material culture, based on an affective strategy that Thorne calls “shame work.” Payless shoes, out-of-date Disney characters, and lunchtime swaps translate into a language of race, ethnicity, and age grading, overwriting the profound class inequalities in Oakland child rearing. In the vision of the future that emerges from Thorne’s chapter 4, similar to the one presented by Flanagan in chapter 6, wealthy people pull their children out of the public sphere, and middle- and lower-income children are left to do the work of democracy by making sense of difference and commonalities through their use of mass-produced commodities.
CONCLUSION: FIGURING THE FUTURE

All the authors suggest different ways that youth and children contribute to how the future is figured—how it is symbolized, hoped for, and made—in the context of globalization. We are building on the well-known truism that “children are the future,” which has been used in so many times and places. Rather than take the association of youth and the future for granted, however, we seek to unravel some of the mechanisms driving this powerfully naturalized association. We parse the vague (and very ideologically useful) idea of “the future” into three dimensions: temporality; the relationship of hope and risk; and the substantive practices through which children, youth, and adults forge new futures. In combination, these suggest some of the ways that children and youth provide the symbolic and practical material through which any group projects—a word that, of course, also means “to throw forward,” as well as a “project” in the sense of a life plan—the future.

To conclude, we point out our argument’s implications for the studies of children, youth, and globalization with which we began. As mentioned, most of the existing literature that specifically addresses youth and globalization focuses on how children or youth mediate the transformation of space currently taking place. By contrast, all the chapters in this volume highlight how children and youth naturalize new relations to time, especially the future, whether it is one filled with risky and uncertain opportunities, increasing poverty and alienation, or hopes of plenty. This emphasis on children and youth’s connection to temporality enables us to make a more general point about contemporary studies of children and youth.

Much recent work has argued that it is important to study young people not as adults in the making, like the anthropology of children and youth beholden to Euro-American models of human development, but as active agents who create cultural forms in the here and now that are worthy of scholarly attention (Amit-Talai and Wulff 1995; Scheper-Hughes and Sargent 1998; Sharp 2002). In many ways, this argument was a valuable analytical move because it freed scholars to consider aspects of children and youth’s lives apart from adult concerns. The irony is that it champions the perspectives of children and youth but increases the likelihood that we will ignore the more general kinds of insights gained from taking children and youth as a site for social and cultural inquiry. And part of our ability to generalize is that all of us do have some kind of childhood and most of us do age.

In fact, the only two books on the subject that have made it into the mainstream of anthropology did so because they used features of youth to illuminate widely shared dilemmas or aspects of the human condition.
Margaret Mead’s (1964[1928]) *Coming of Age in Samoa* used the experience of adolescence in Samoa to establish the primacy of culture, refuting European-derived developmental models and making policy recommendations for the United States in the process. Paul Willis’s (1977) *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* turned the predicament of working-class youth in England into an illustration of how any group, not just young people, can participate in the reproduction of a system that is ultimately harmful to the group’s own interests.

The chapters in this volume provide plenty of empirical detail about children and youth, because children and youth want and use the products of multinational corporations; because they actively produce new popular culture and new kinds of hierarchies and social configurations; because they are the objects of intervention for transnational NGOs; and because some of them use technologies such as the Internet to engage in new kinds of politics. We have not chosen to highlight these points in our introduction, as those who hold the perspective that youth are interesting in their “own right” might expect. Rather, we have argued that certain aspects of children and youth make them a particularly sharp lens through which to understand the figuring of the future for all age groups in the contemporary moment. And we have shown how broad social science claims about space/time compression become imagined, routinized, and sometimes contested for people of all ages because of the actions of, and practices around, youth. For these reasons, the youth and children of the world and the processes they reveal should be taken very seriously.

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**Notes**

1. Scape is borrowed from Arjun Appadurai (1996), who coined terms like *ethnoscape* and *financescape*.

2. Ruddick’s thesis builds on Sharon Stephens’ (1995) earlier essay “Children and the Politics of Culture in ‘Late Capitalism.’” Stephens argued that the image of the innocent child in need of nurture (as well as its inverse, the working-class child in need of control) was produced by social divisions that emerged in the late nineteenth century. This particular image of the child underwrote divisions—between public and
private, male and female, old and young—that were central to the reorganization of Western industrial society. Stephens argued that the sense of children in crisis emerged, in part, because older arrangements of labor, gender, the domestic realm, and class relations were being reworked.

3. These changes took place in schools, family and new juvenile law, the organization of play, and commodity culture.

4. The expression “on the cusp of hope and failure” first arose in Ann Anagnost’s chapter 3, on childrearing in a liberalizing China.